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ABSTRACT 
Despite being the focus of directed management for decades, marine fisheries around the world are in decline. We surveyed the 
literature to evaluate the efficacy of small-scale fishery cooperatives in managing common-pool fishery resources, and to identify the 
prevailing challenges to cooperative formation and operation, and the critical design elements for successful cooperatives. Collective 
management of common-pool fishery resources by users organized into cooperatives can result not only in sustainable resource use 
and enhanced socioeconomic benefits, but also in ecosystem conservation and stewardship. The effectiveness of fishery cooperatives 
depends on a variety of factors. In addition, there must be measures for aligning the cooperative members’ interests with long-term 
sustainability, including the presence of secure fishing rights.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Small-scale fishermen need to find ways to  rebuild depleted fish populations and sustain healthy ones in order to 
maintain their livelihoods, and fishery cooperatives offer promising solutions. In capture-fishery cooperatives, fishermen 
can become empowered to influence decision-making on the management of the resources that they rely on. They also 
benefit from economies of scale when purchasing fishing equipment, and gain power in negotiating fish prices (FAO 2009). 
Under some conditions, joint management between cooperatives and governments also facilitates the establishment of 
measures to protect the sustainability of fishing resources, such as the establishment of marine protected areas (e.g., 
Pomeroy and Beck 1999, Ovando et al. 2013).  
In a review of small-scale fishery cooperatives worldwide, Pollnac (1988) identified attributes that were important in 
determining the success or failure of cooperatives in meeting their objectives (Table 1). In a study of 48 fishery cooperatives 
throughout coastal Ecuador, Poggie et al. (1988) found that the presence of cooperative facilities (running water, sanitation 
systems, lights, television, and fish storage equipment) and social solidarity (members carrying out obligations, good 
relations among members) were correlated with the perceived performance of cooperatives among their members.  
In this study, we surveyed the literature to identify additional attributes that were identified by authors as leading to the 
success or failure of small-scale fishery cooperatives. The goal of this study was to address the existing information gap on 
common factors of success for fisheries cooperation (discussed in Ovando et al. 2013) by incorporating studies conducted 
after Pollnac (1988), and considering the renewed interest on fishery cooperatives as part of the solution in coastal-resource 
management (Jentoft et al. 2011). 
 
METHODS 
We searched the bibliographical database Web of Science (Thomson Reuters) for journal articles that contained 
information on factors that have contributed to, or have impeded, the success of small-scale fishery cooperatives. We used 
the truncated search terms Fishery* and Cooperative* in the search field “Topic”, and we limited our search from 1989 to 
the present (to identify articles posterior to Pollnac 1988). From the number of articles found in the literature search (211), 
we selected those whose Abstract contained information on the authors’ perception on the success or failure of cooperatives 
in achieving their ecological, social, and/or economic objectives. Given the difficulty in uniquely defining small and large-
scale fisheries because of differences in fisheries technology among countries (FAO 2012), we used the classifications 
provided by the authors of the different studies. We classified fisheries that were described as “industrial” in the large-scale 
category. For each of the cooperatives studied, we identified the factors that were perceived by the authors to lead to success 
or failure, a well as the ecological, social, and economic benefits resulting from cooperation. 
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Table 1. Attributes of success or failure of small-scale fishery cooperatives, classified by category (adapted from Pollnac, 
1988). 
Category Attributes 
  
Cooperative origins 
and background 
  
  
  
  
Local initiative: Organizations formed on the basis of local initiatives are more likely to succeed1
 
  
Early interest by fishermen: A vested interest by fishermen, in the form of an early investment in capital or labor, 
provides an incentive to work harder to achieve success. 
  
Foundation in traditional organizations: Fishery organizations that emerge from preexisting organizations are 
more likely to succeed. 
  
Past experience: Previous negative experiences of fishermen with fishery organizations are predictors of failure. 
  
Organization structure:  Using successful local models as templates increases the likelihood of success. 
  
Legislation: Complex regulations can impair cooperative registration and access to loans and tax concessions. 
  
Training needs: Educating government extension agents and cooperative leaders on the potential benefits of 
cooperatives facilitates increased membership in cooperatives. 
  
Legislative support: Legislation assigning property rights to fishermen organizations has contributed to their  
success. 
  
Vested interests: Groups who feel negatively affected by the establishment of a cooperative can employ methods 
(including applying political pressure) to undermine the cooperative. 
  
Membership 
  
Group size: New cooperatives should be designed to be the size of existing successful organizations. Traditional 
patterns of social interactions dictate the optimum size of an organization. 
  
Members: Success will ultimately depend on members being willing to perform their duties. One way to maintain 
member reliability is to recruit only people with close ties to the fishery as members. 
  
Homogeneity of members: Cooperatives whose members have similar goals and values are more likely to suc-
ceed. 
  
Administration 
  
Management expertise: There are a large number of examples worldwide of fishermen organizations failing due 
to inadequate management skills. The ability to manage their own organization requires skills that fishermen may 
not have, and often there is resistance to having “outsiders” managing the organizations. 
  
Complexity: As organizations grow, they tend to assume more tasks and to become more complex and difficult to 
manage. Managers should take steps to prevent this complexity from threatening success. 
  
Participation: There is a strong participation by cooperative members in management decisions, and the ability 
and willingness of fishermen to participate in meetings is essential. 
  
Interagency cooperation: Several government agencies are frequently involved in the development and  
maintenance of fishermen organizations, and excessive bureaucratic procedures can impair organizational  
 performance. Coordination among agencies can reduce the bureaucratic burden. 
  
Socioeconomic 
factors 
  
Availability of capital: The lack of capital has often impeded the establishment of cooperatives, but dependence 
on government subsidies as a financial source has contributed to failure. The perception of fishermen organiza-
tions as an opportunity for investment instead of as exclusively potential credit sources strengthens organiza-
tions. 
  
Compliance with 
rules 
  
Evasion of rules, such as fishing in no-take areas and selling fishery products outside of the cooperative, under-
mine trust and can lead to failure. 
  
1However, local initiative has been seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for success. For example, Jentoft and Sandersen 
(1996) noted the failure of many fishing cooperatives that were formed through local initiatives. In addition, many successful community 
initiatives have received external support from their inception, including supporting legislation from the government and financial assis-
tance from external organizations (Jentoft et al. 2011). 
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RESULTS 
We found 21 studies on 20 fishery cooperatives that 
met the search parameters discussed (Table 2); 18 of the 
cooperatives were in small-scale fisheries, as defined 
above. There was a wide geographical representation: 
Central and North America (9), Indo-Pacific (7), Caribbean 
(3), Europe (2), and Asia (1). A broad range of benefits 
resulted from the establishment of the cooperatives (Table 
2), and the presence (or absence) of secure fishing rights 
was reported to influence success (or failure) in 18 out of 
the 20 studies. Educating government extension agents and 
cooperative leaders on the potential benefits of coopera-
tives facilitates increased membership in cooperatives. 
Attributes related to success or failure of fishery coopera-
tives gleaned from literature posterior to Pollnac (1988) are 
listed in Table 2.  
  
DISCUSSION 
Scientific studies of fishery cooperatives since 
Pollnac’s review (1988) confirm that cooperation in fishing 
can generate many conservation and socioeconomic 
benefits including some that transcend the original goals of 
cooperating. For example, fishermen can decide to 
cooperate to reduce costs and maximize revenues, but a 
fishing cooperative set up for that purpose can bring one or 
more of the following types of benefits:  
i) Producer benefits (e.g., reduced search time due to 
information sharing; reduced input costs by 
buying in bulk; access to financing of infrastruc-
ture). 
ii) Market benefits (e.g., reduced costs for market 
access; increased market power which changes the 
relationship with buyers; easier access to new 
markets). 
iii) Management benefits (e.g., reduced transaction 
costs of agreements and decision making; quick 
and appropriate sanctions). 
iv) Conservation benefits (e.g., lower by-catch due to 
information sharing; higher compliance with catch 
limits and other conservation targets; joint 
monitoring of protected areas; sustainable yields). 
v) Social benefits (e.g., community empowerment, 
job retention, maintenance of fishing culture, new 
educational opportunities, increased safety in 
fishing activities, increase in social ties). 
 
Fishing cooperatives address problems of resource use 
in a variety of ways (Ovando et al. 2013), but even so there 
appear to be a limited number of factors that predict the 
success or failure of cooperatives in achieving their goals. 
Besides the factors that have been known to contribute to 
success for many years (Table 1), secure fishing rights 
seem to be an important precursor to success with respect 
to actions aimed at increasing sustainability (Ovando et al. 
2013). However, for cooperation that is durable and 
successful over time, secure rights have to be accompanied 
by skillful management (Jentoft et al. 1998). For their part, 
good management skills can only be fully utilized when 
institutional arrangements ensure that the decisions of local 
managers will be respected at higher levels of administra-
tion. (Jentoft 2005).   
The emergence of cooperation to achieve common 
goals in fisheries does not always occur with the purpose of 
sustaining the resource. When strong social ties that 
facilitate cooperation are present, but resource use occurs 
without limited and secure access, cooperation can actually 
lead to overexploitation. Examples are the cooperative of 
commercial divers in Puerto Peñasco, Mexico, as well as 
lobster and conch cooperatives in Belize, where access to 
new markets, credit, and new technologies, combined with  
inadequate regulations for resource use, resulted in 
excessive resource extraction (Table 2). 
Other challenges to cooperative durability include the 
imposition of rules from outside agents; difficulties in the 
formation of capital to sustain the cooperatives; conflicts of 
interest between cooperative members; the need to address 
multiple problems faced by a fishery; and the need to count 
on efficient management from members of the fishing 
community (Jentoft, 1986). The establishment of secure 
fishing rights faces challenges of its own (see Bonzon et al. 
2010), such as developing a system for share allocation that 
receives wide support by fishermen and cooperatives that 
participate in catch-share programs. Overcoming all of 
these challenges demands a change in the top-down 
approach prevalent in many fisheries worldwide, and, 
although this may not require a complete restructuring of 
current governance and institutional structures, even 
modest modifications can take considerable time (Noble 
2000). Given the current state of the world’s fisheries and 
the urgent need for solutions, pursuing strategies to 
encourage the replication of successful experiences in 
cooperation warrants particular attention.  
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Table 2. Ecological, social, and economic benefits of small-scale fishery cooperatives, and attributes of success or failure 
not included in Table 1. (N.R.= not reported). 
Cooperative Benefits/Costs 
 
 Attributes 
  
Cooperatives of the Regional Federation of 
Cooperative Societies of Baja California, 
Mexico (FEDECOOP) (Pérez Ramírez et al. 
2012) 
Ecol: Regulations to protect fish recruit-
ment. 
  
Soc: Community empowerment (autonomy 
in decision-making). 
  
Econ: Ability to negotiate prices. 
Fishery concessions (exclusive territorial 
access rights). 
  
Compliance and self-enforcement of  
scientifically-based total allowable catch. 
Abalone fishermen in southeastern Austral-
ia (Gilmour et al. 2011) 
Ecol: When fishermen perceived declines in 
stock abundance, they cooperated within 
their fishermen associations to design rules 
to protect depleted fishing areas. 
  
Soc: N.R. 
  
Econ: N.R. 
In addition to secure fishing rights in the 
form of individual fishing quotas and high 
levels of trust between fishermen, rules for 
resource management appeared only when 
there was a common perception that fishing 
areas are overexploited. 
Cooperatives in the Turkish Aegean (Ünal 
et al. 2011) 
Ecol: N.R. 
  
Soc: Educational opportunities. 
  
Econ: Credit opportunities, profit sharing, 
marketing facilities, auctioning services, 
discounted input prices. 
Government assistance was provided to 
maintain cooperative services to its  
members, such as credit opportunities, 
during times of economic hardship. 
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Table 2 continued. Ecological, social, and economic benefits of small-scale fishery cooperatives, and attributes of suc-
cess or failure not included in Table 1. (N.R.= not reported). 
  
Cooperative 
  
Benefits/Cost 
  
Attributes 
Commercial divers of Puerto Peñasco, Gulf 
of California, Mexico  (Cudney-Bueno and 
Basurto 2009) 
Ecol: Increase in local resource abundance. 
  
Soc: Increase in social ties. 
  
Econ: Increase in fishermen profits. 
Stakeholder participation in monitoring was 
crucial for the emergence of cooperation. 
 
Lack of formally-recognized exclusive terri-
torial access rights led to the demise of 
cooperation. Strong community ties  
became a negative factor, as it led to  
resource overexploitation by cooperative 
members as a means of preventing fishing 
by outside fishermen. 
Seri Indian fishing cooperative, Gulf of 
California, Mexico (Basurto 2008) 
Ecol: Protection of buffer areas (seagrass 
meadows). 
  
Soc: Ability to remain in the fishery by ne-
gotiating resource prices and collectively 
harvesting resources commanding high 
prices. 
  
Econ: Ability to maintain a regular income 
from the fishery. 
Cooperatives had exclusive territorial  
access rights. 
  
Local knowledge on sustainable resource-
harvesting practices (minimum sizes,  
closure of buffer areas) was used to inform 
management. 
Tilefish fishermen of Montauk, New York 
State (Kitts et al. 2007) 
Ecol: N.R. 
  
Soc: Ability of fishermen to participate in 
fishery management plans. Improved fish-
ing-safety conditions. 
  
Econ: Higher and steadier income flow. 
A quota share was assigned to the  
cooperative. 
  
Lobster and conch cooperatives in Belize 
(Huitric 2005) 
Ecol: Overexploitation of lobster and conch 
suggested by a decrease in catch per unit 
effort since the establishment of the coop-
eratives. 
  
Soc: Some fishermen have benefited from 
export markets, and their increased income 
allowed them to pay for the schooling of 
their children. A large number of fishermen 
became indebted and could not repay their 
loans. 
  
Econ: A general decrease in fishermen’s 
income. 
The establishment of fishery cooperatives 
gave fishermen access to export markets, 
credit, and new technologies, but resulted 
in overexploitation because there were 
inadequate regulations for resource use. 
  
The open-access nature of the fisheries did 
not create incentives for cooperatives to 
manage the resources for sustainability. 
Fishing cooperatives in Capiz Province, 
The Philippines (Baticados 2004) 
Ecol: Increased resource abundance with 
community-based management. 
  
Soc: Tenurial rights were granted to coop-
eratives. Increased ability to influence gov-
ernment policies on coastal management. 
  
Econ: Possibility of obtaining credit. In-
creased fishery catches. 
The participation of fishermen in coastal 
resource management through their coop-
erative was positively influenced by a per-
ceived likelihood of a threat to their liveli-
hood; an awareness of coastal conserva-
tion programs; the support received from 
the government in controlling illegal fishing; 
and the number of children that fishermen 
had. Cooperatives procured exclusive-use 
rights to fishing grounds. 
Sockeye salmon fishermen cooperative in 
Chignik, Alaska (Kitts and Edwards, 2003; 
Deacon et al. 20082,3)  
Ecol: N.R. 
  
Soc:N.R. 
  
Econ: Members of the cooperative created 
a profit sharing agreement that substantially 
reduced the number of boats and the fish-
ing costs. 
The cooperative was assigned a portion of 
the total catch, which enabled a profit-
sharing agreement. 
1Large-scale fishery, as defined above. 
2This cooperative ultimately failed due to legal challenges. 
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Table 2 continued. Ecological, social, and economic benefits of small-scale fishery cooperatives, and attributes of suc-
cess or failure not included in Table 1. (N.R.= not reported). 
Cooperative Benefits/Cost Attributes 
Fishermen of Toyama Bay, Japan (Gaspart 
and Seki 2003) 
Ecol: N.R. 
  
Soc: Cooperatives have allowed fishermen 
to gain the right to expand their fishing are-
as. 
  
Econ: N.R. 
A successful profit-sharing arrangement 
occurred even when fishermen had varying 
degrees of fishing skills because of social 
norms that engendered pride in being the 
best fishermen. 
 
In Japan, coastal communities have exclu-
sive rights over adjacent waters.   
Fishing communities in Vanuatu, Samoa, 
Cook Islands, Fiji, Palau, Hawaii, and Tuva-
lu (Johannes 2002) 
Ecol: Revival of the application of traditional 
practices for sustainable resource use. 
  
Soc: Resurgence of pride in traditional re-
source management practices. 
  
Econ: Increased income from marine-
related tourism. 
A resurgence of community-based  
management of fishery resources was at-
tributed to a growing scarcity of resources, 
the independence of some of the islands 
from former colonial powers that imposed 
“Western” management regimes, and a 
strengthening of the right of communities to 
control access to their traditional fishing 
grounds. 
Fishermen association of Malalison Island, 
The Philippines  (Baticados and Agbayani 
2000) 
Ecol: Visual census and fishermen’s per-
ceptions suggest an increase in juvenile fish 
in a fish sanctuary created by the fishermen 
association. 
  
Soc: Through membership in the associa-
tion, fishermen gained power in advocating 
for changes in fishery management. 
  
Econ: N.R. 
The fishermen association was successful 
in gaining territorial use rights over a small 
area. 
  
The success of the fishermen association 
depended in part on enforcement assis-
tance provided by the local government. 
Fishermen in Fijian traditional fishing 
grounds (Cooke et al. 2000) 
Ecol: N.R. 
  
Soc: N.R. 
  
Econ: N.R. 
The strength of leadership of local rulers 
was seen as essential for the success of 
traditional cooperative fishing schemes. 
Traditional fishing grounds were divided 
among clans. 
U.S. Pacific Northwest and Fishing compa-
nies in the Alaska groundfish fisheries 
(Sullivan 2000)4
 
Ecol: The creation of quota-sharing cooper-
atives resulted in the elimination of the race 
to fish and the scattering of fishing to larger 
areas, reducing the risk of localized deple-
tion of pollock stocks. 
  
Soc: Increased ability of fishermen to nego-
tiate quota shares. 
  
Econ: N.R. 
When barriers to entry were created and 
eliminated open access, fishermen  
recognized the benefits of creating  
cooperatives that received a share of the 
quota. 
Fishermen of Big Creek Ecological Re-
serve, California (Pomeroy and Beck 1999) 
Ecol: An informal cooperative agreement by 
fishermen led to a rotation of fishing 
grounds to reduce pressure on resources, 
and the establishment of a no-take zone. 
  
Soc: Cooperation increased safety, as fish-
ermen helped each other with launching 
and landing their boats during bad weather. 
Fishermen also shared fishing data. 
  
Econ: N.R. 
The close personal relationship between 
the reserve manager and the fishermen 
was conducive to cooperation. However, 
increased pressure on fishery resources 
due to the lack of barriers to entry was a 
threat to the cooperative arrangement. 
Lobster fishermen of Caye Caulker, Belize 
(King 1997) 
Ecol: N.R. 
  
Soc: N.R. 
  
Econ: Long-term stable yields of lobster. 
The traditional management system allocat-
ed territories to fishermen. An absence of a 
conservation objective is a threat to the 
lobster stock. 
4Large-scale fishery, as defined above.  
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Table 2 continued. Ecological, social, and economic benefits of small-scale fishery cooperatives, and attributes of suc-
cess or failure not included in Table 1. (N.R.= not reported). 
  
Cooperative 
  
Benefits/Cost 
  
Attributes 
Coastal fishermen in Hokkaido, Japan  
(Barrett and Okudaira 1995) 
Ecol: In Japan, yields of many coastal re-
sources have been maintained in time. 
  
Soc: N.R. 
  
Econ: In Japan, the average income of 
coastal fishermen has grown steadily. 
By placing conservation as an explicit goal, 
Japanese fishing cooperatives have  
maintained stable yields of coastal re-
sources. 
  
Coastal communities have exclusive rights 
over adjacent waters. 
  
Competition for resources between fishing 
cooperatives in Hokkaido led to severe 
emigration of affected fishermen. 
Users of mangrove resources in St. Lucia 
(Smith and Berkes 1993) 
Ecol: Density of mangrove shoots in-
creased with cooperative management. 
  
Soc: Sustainable management of mangrove 
trees that provide fuelwood to local commu-
nities. 
  
Econ: N.R. 
Elimination of open-access conditions in-
creased interest in the formation of a coop-
erative for the extraction of mangrove. 
Fishery cooperatives in socialist Poland 
(Jentoft and Marciniak 1991) 
Ecol: N.R. 
  
Soc: N.R. 
  
Econ: N.R. 
The National Union of Fishery Cooperatives 
(NUFC) was crucial to the success of its 
member cooperatives. It represented coop-
eratives in the negotiation of the Polish 
national quota, and administered the alloca-
tion of quota shares among cooperatives. 
Individual cooperatives had the obligation to 
allocate their quota internally and to enforce 
fishing regulations. In one of the co-ops, an 
annual lottery system was used to allocate 
fishing areas to individual fishermen. 
  
On behalf of the cooperatives, the NUFC 
also negotiated fish prices with the  
government, imported fishing equipment, 
and provided endorsements for coopera-
tives seeking bank credits 
  
The cooperatives agreed informally to fish 
only in areas designated to each. 
Fishery cooperative in socialist Bulgaria 
(Marciniak and Jentoft 1992) 
Ecol: N.R. 
  
Soc: N.R. 
  
Econ: With the establishment of the cooper-
ative, fishermen gained power to set prices 
and to demand prompt payments. 
 
  
